It is a fact that states with a high corruption rate (or a high corruption perception) are at the same time those with a poor human rights record. Beyond this coincidence, the paper seeks to identify a concrete legal relationship between corruption and deficient human rights protection. This is in practical terms relevant, because the extant international norms against corruption have so far yielded only modest success; their implementation could be improved with the help of human rights arguments and instruments.
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Statement of the Problem
The UN General Assembly's Agenda 2030 for sustainable development of 2015 asks all
States to "substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms", and to return all stolen assets by 2030. 1 In their official contributions to this Agenda, the Human Rights Treaty
Bodies have "identified mismanagement of resources and corruption as obstacles to the allocation of resources to promote equal rights." 2 In fact, countries with high rates of corruption are the ones with a poor human rights record. 3 For instance, the States ranked lowest on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index of 2015 are
Afghanistan, North Korea, and Somalia, all of which have massive human rights problems. 4 Apparently, corruption and human rights violations thrive in the same environments and probably have the same root causes, such as poverty and weak institutions. Corruption, which follows the unofficial laws of the market, upsets the legal framework.
Conceptually, corruption therefore constitutes the negation of the rule of law and thus also of the idea of human rights. Furthermore, corruption is often an aggravating factor in a human rights violation. It is an entirely different question, however, whether corruption may constitute a human rights violation in itself. Only if corrupt behaviour may in fact violate specific human rights in concrete cases, then corruption could not only be a topic in the general monitoring schemes (UPR and treaty-based state reporting), but moreover play a part in individual complaints before the extant human rights committees, regional human rights courts, and in arbitral procedures.
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I will investigate the problem in the form of a double question: 7 Can corrupt conduct be properly conceptualized as a violation of international human rights? (part 2) And secondly:
Should corrupt acts be classified and sanctioned as human rights violations? My answer is that such a reconceptualization is legally sound, and that its normative and practical benefits outweigh the risk of reinforcing the anti-Western skepticism towards the fight against corruption (part 3). This assessment leads to the practice recommendation of a mutual mainstreaming of the international anti-corruption and human rights procedures (part 4). Part 5 concludes that the re-framing of corruption not only as a human right issue but as a potential human rights violation can contribute to closing the implementation gap of the international anti-corruption instruments.
The proposal to infuse corruption with human rights aspects responds to the moderate success of the existing international anti-corruption instruments -at least ten international and regional treaties with various additional protocols as well as soft law. 8 Their emergence in the 6 While the primary forums for dealing with human rights complaints (including those based on corruption allegations are the domestic forums (courts, National Human Rights Institutions, and others), this paper leaves aside the domestic remedies. 7 Two other links between corruption and human rights are not dealt with in this paper: First, the effective protection of (some) human rights (especially freedom of access to information and freedom of the press) is indispensable for combating corruption. Numerous human rights complaints concern the murder, forced disappearance, and lack of governmental protection of journalists who had investigated and publicly denounced corruption (see, e.g. The problem is that corruption still largely goes unsanctioned. The number of criminal convictions for domestic and foreign bribery is notoriously low worldwide. Only four of the currently 41 States parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention are truly "active" in their implementation. 14 Hence, the enforcement of the international anti-corruption norms needs to be improved. This could be done with the help of human rights arguments and instruments.
Can corruption be conceptualized as a human rights violation?

Defining corruption
Corruption 15 is not a technical term; it is not considered a criminal offence in most criminal codes around the world and it also does not have a legal definition in most international treaties. The most common definition is the one by the NGO Transparency International, according to which corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Such abuse may happen on the level of day-to-day administration and public service (petty corruption), or on the high level of political office (grand corruption). These terms do not mark a legal distinction but merely describe variations of the same theme. Often, a particular scheme of corruption permeates the various levels of public administration, and thus links both forms of corruption. Because of the growing power of large corporations and non-State actors such as FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), 16 the abuse of obligations arising from private law -in a private law-based principal-agent relationship -is also increasingly qualified as corruption. The relevant criminal offences are active and passive bribery, criminal breach of trust, graft, illicit enrichment, and so on. In the private sector, offences are called "private-to-private bribery" or "commercial bribery", and may include anti-competitive practices and regulatory offences. 
Whose human rights?
Traditionally, bribery, the prototypical form of corruption, has been considered a "victimless crime". 17 According to legal doctrine, the injured party is first of all the public. Moreover, the core of bribery is a "wrongful agreement". 18 Can the bribe-giver be considered a victim, too?
This does not seem to be the case where the victim takes the initiative to bribe, and/or then blackmails the receiver.
However, the briber may be victimized in many constellations of corruption. If the graduate of a public school has to pay the secretary a bribe to receive her diploma, or if she has to pay for additional private lessons from a teacher who indicates that she will not pass the examination otherwise, then she is a victim -not a perpetrator -at least in terms of human rights. Her consent to the illegal quid pro quo is the result of a desperate situation; the consent of the student (or of her parents) is not "free", but rather coerced.
Public procurement is the economic sector most susceptible to corruption; the EU estimates that approximately 13% of all budget spending for public procurement is lost. 19 Here the unsuccessful competitors are the potential victims if they are not awarded the contract due to extraneous criteria, at least if they have a concrete expectancy to the contract and not merely abstract prospects. Clients and end users are of course also adversely affected by corruption in public procurement if they have to pay higher prices or if they receive a product that is not worth the money because funds have been diverted during the production process. Related questions are how corruption may affect the property and investor rights of the successful bidders. Of course the assessment will differ depending on whether the bidder had won the tender through corruption, or whether his investment has been tampered with later by corrupt acts of the host state. These questions will be discussed in section 3.3.
In the political process, voters are adversely affected by candidates' financial dependence on major donors if the candidates are politically indebted to the donors after the election and if voters are unaware of those vested interests. The question is now whether those persons who are affected directly or indirectly are sufficiently individualised, and whether human rights are actually at stake in these scenarios. 
Which human rights?
The idea is not to propagate any (new) human right to a corruption-free society. 20 in Indonesia alleged. 24 In other cases of grand corruption and foreign bribery, however, the implications for human rights -such as the effect of nepotism on the right to equal access to public offices (Article 25(c) ICCPR) -are less clear.
Violations?
The third question is whether it even makes sense to speak of human rights violations. In the predominant practice of the United Nations, only weaker vocabulary is used to make the connection, both in the strategic documents -such as the new reports of the Human Rights 
Which State obligations?
In order to determine whether there is a violation, we have to examine what kinds of obligations are generated by the human rights in question in order to determine which of them can be violated by corrupt State action.
Three dimensions of obligations
All types of human rights give rise to three kinds of obligations, namely the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect is essentially a negative obligation to refrain from infringements. The obligation to protect primarily refers to protection from dangers emanating from third parties. 
Obligations of officials and of the State
We have to distinguish two points of contact in this regard: firstly, the specific corrupt 
Obligations of the State to protect
In the following discussion, I will focus on the macro level, namely the question of how to qualify -from the perspective of these three dimensions of obligation -the lack of effective 35 See, e.g., Boersma 2012 (n. 5), 244 in regard to the right to housing. 36 Legislative omissions thus in principle also fall under the heading of human rights violations through omission: Para. 15(d) of the Maastricht Guidelines (n. 34) mentions the "failure to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating economic, social and cultural rights" (italics mine). 37 See Anne Peters, Jenseits der Menschenrechte (Tübingen: Mohr 2014), 234-245. 38 In the area of social rights, it has not been necessary to distinguish "objective" state duties from "subjective" rights to state action until entry into force of the Optional Protocol of the ICESCR providing for individual communications, because social rights were until then not (quasi-)justiciable (on an individual basis). Under German constitutional law, a right to have laws enacted or amended arises from basic rights only in extreme cases, "when it is evident that an originally lawful rule has become unsustainable under constitutional law in the interim due to changes to the circumstances, and if the legislative power has nonetheless failed to act or has enacted evidently deficient corrective measures" (Federal in order to fulfil the obligations to protect and to fulfil (including to prevent) grounded in human rights law.
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Procedural obligations
Cutting across the three dimensions of human rights obligations, procedural obligations arise from all the types of human rights. In the case law of the ECtHR, these constitute the "procedural limb" of the rights under the ECHR. Within the scope of social human rights, they are referred to as "process requirements". 46 Here, one of their functions is to serve as an indicator for the fulfilment of the progressive obligation to implement, which is very difficult to measure. Procedural elements are also central to combating corruption. The human rights process requirements relevant here most likely include planning obligations 47 and monitoring obligations. 48 Transparency obligations are especially important. Not coincidentally, the bestknown anti-corruption NGO in the world is called "Transparency International".
Transparency is also a fundamental principle of the UNCAC (2003). 49 Accordingly, the procedural obligations under UNCAC, especially the disclosure and publication requirements, which can be an effective way to curtail corruption, are equally grounded in human rights. 50 Viewed in that light, failure to satisfy these obligations simultaneously constitutes a violation of the relevant human rights.
Result-independent obligations
A follow-up question is whether a corrupt State violates its obligations of protection and its 11; Maastricht Guidelines (n. 34), para. 15(f). 49 See, e.g., Articles 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 UNCAC (n. 8). See also OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), Section VII: Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion, para. 5: "Enhance the transparency of their activities in the fight against bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion". 50 See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11) (1999), para. 23 on transparency as a guiding principle for the formulation and implementation of national strategies for the right to food.
principle on the specific primary obligation whether "prevent" means that a State must in fact avert the undesirable result, or whether the State is merely obligated to employ all reasonable and appropriate means in the sense of a due diligence obligation that is independent of the result.
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The anti-corruption obligations under human rights law mentioned above should be interpreted in a result-independent manner. This establishes a parallelism to criminal law.
Bribery and other offences that we summarize under the umbrella of corruption are, generally speaking, "endangerment offences". This means that they criminalize conduct which endanger legally protected interests even if that conduct does not produce a specific harmful consequence. This is appropriate to the legally protected interest which is the integrity of the public service, because it is usually impossible to determine whether a tangible harm has in fact occurred. If the bribing of a public official does not entail that the briber is granted a doctor's appointment faster than without the bribe, or if a briber does not receive a building permit exceeding the official's normal discretion, then the bribes would, in a non-technical sense, be "unsuccessful". Nevertheless, the trust in the public service has been undermined, and for that reason the unlawful agreement should be punished as bribery. In the courts, this rationale is referred to as follows: "Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." 52 The situation here is different than in the case of the obligation to prevent genocide, for example. In that case, the ICJ held that "a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed". 53 This difference in assessment is justified because genocide is a result offence in terms of criminal law, as opposed to an endangerment offence.
Conversely, the obligation (also under human rights law) to combat corruption, as follows for instance from the UNCAC, does not require States to stop corruption entirely. The satisfaction of such a "negative" obligation of result (and the measurement of such a result)
would be impossible, given that the realization of a low level of systematic corruption is not a one-time success. It is, in contrast, easy to determine that a genocide, for instance, has not been commited. 
Corruption as a violation of the fundamental obligations set out in Article 2(1) ICESCR
Under certain circumstances, corruption (both petty and grand) must notably be considered a violation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
As mentioned above, corruption -for example in the police force and the judiciary − also affects human rights enshrined in the ICCPR. But this section concentrates on the ICESCR because the legal determination of a violation of this Covenant is particularly challenging.
Article 2(1) ICESCR, which sets out the fundamental obligations of the States parties, contains four components that are subject to monitoring by the treaty body, the CESCR.
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Each component is a starting point for specific State obligations, including in the field of anticorruption. Each of these obligations may become difficult or impossible to fulfil in the circumstances of grand or petty corruption.
The first element -the core obligation -is "to take steps". These steps, according to the CESCR, must be "deliberate, concrete and targeted". 55 It is easy to see that the steps to be taken must include the elimination of obstacles to the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. Because corruption constitutes such an obstacle, States are in principle required by the ICESCR to take anti-corruption measures. 56 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for instance, in its guidelines for national reporting, considers ratification of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the existence, powers, and budget of a domestic anti-corruption authority to be structural indicators for national progress reports.
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The second component of the implementation obligation set out in Article 2 of the ICESCR is that the State party must take these steps "with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant". This component obligates parties to grant a certain priority in the allocation of resources to the realization of human 54 On the operationalization of these elements, see the law violated the rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination regarding political participation (Arts. 7 and 21 UDHR) as incorporated in the Tanzanian Constitution.
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Especially the solicitation or acceptance of petty bribes may be discriminatory, too. A wouldbe-bribe-taker in the public service is likely to assess the victim's ability and willingness to pay the bribe, and will adjust his request and the sum requested accordingly. The distinction he operates here -the target's willingness and ability to pay -is in itself unlawful and arbitrary. Moreover, the officer's assessment is often determined by the targeted person's property status or his or her membership in social groups. Persons belonging to some groups may be judged by the bribe-requester as better able to meet a (larger) request for a bribe.
Persons are thus treated differently without a reasonable justification.
So if an individual is unable or unwilling to pay a bribe, e.g., in order to pass a police checkpoint or to receive a passport, and is thus unable to continue a journey or exit the country, and if the State does not take any measures to combat the corrupt conduct of individual officers, it is both the bribe-taker's action and the State's passivity which has a disproportionate negative impact on individuals without means. Then not only the affected persons' civil liberties are curtailed. For lack of a legal basis and a legitimate purpose of the request for payment, these persons are also being discriminated against in conjunction with their right to move freely or to exit the country. I submit that this legal assessment does capture the social meaning of corruption, as expressed by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the foreword to the UN Convention against Corruption, namely that corruption "hurts the poor disproportionately" and promotes "inequality". 
Causation
A key problem for determining a human rights violation through corrupt conduct is causation.
73 This is true both for omissions by the State as a whole as well as for the corrupt acts of individual public officials that occur concomitantly. In these cases, the ECtHR denied a sufficient causal link between the identified human rights violations and the claimed pecuniary loss, e.g., loss of income due to non-recognition of a diploma (Chevrol), loss of job due to travel undertaken to visit a child that had been kidnapped in violation of the right to family life (Sylvester), or compensation of recognized that causation (in the sense of a conditio sine qua non or "necessity", or in terms of a "'but for'-test") must be supplemented by an evaluative element that "in legal contemplation" cuts off chains of causation that are excessively long. 82 There must be "proximity" 83 between the legal breach and the damage. Only for damage/losses that are "not too remote" 84 reparation is owed. 85 "Proximity" is determined on the basis of the objective criterion of "natural and normal consequence" 86 and the subjective criterion of "foreseeability".
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Applied to our effort to determine the causal link between a corrupt State action and the legal breach (cause in fact), these terms convey the idea that corrupt acts (or omissions) cause human rights violations in the legal sense only if the violations -such as of the right to food, housing, or education -are foreseeable and not too far removed from the corrupt public officials (or the otherwise passive apparatus of the State). In many cases, these requirements are likely to be met. For instance, an arrangement for a court official to receive a small sum of money to summon a witness is causally related to the violation of the right to a fair trial.
Similarly, bribes paid to the employee of an environmental supervisory authority, intended to induce the employee to "overlook" the creation of an illegal toxic waste dump, must − according to these principles − be qualified as a cause of the subsequent adverse health effects of the local residents. In such cases, the approval of the toxic waste dump and the damage to excessively long imprisonment in violation of Article 4 ECHR (Nowicka). However, the requirements for such causation were not examined in any detail. 82 
Special problems of causation
In addition to the situation where the "distance" between the cause and the human rights violation is too great -which is especially frequent in the context of grand corruption -other special problems of causation arise. A common situation occurs when the human rights violation has several causes, only one of which is corruption, while only both causes in combination have brought about the human rights violation ("cumulative causation"). As an example, assume that school children are killed by the falling debris of a collapsing school during an earthquake. After the incident, it is determined that the school was built with deficient materials because construction materials had been diverted by municipal officials for their own use and the building inspector had been bribed. Although the corruption was only a necessary but not a sufficient condition (not sufficient because it still needed the earthquake)
for the school breaking down and killing the children, corruption was still a conditio sine qua non, and therefore a cause for the human rights violation in the sense of the law.
A different and widespread scenario is that various factors are concurrent. We call this "concurrent", "dual", "competing", or "alternative" causality. This is the situation that both factors, taken for themselves, would have sufficed to bring about the effect. For instance, violations of social human rights frequently stem from an allocation of resources without the proper prioritization of social human rights. If corruption comes on top, both factors concur.
Or, in our example, the construction material used due to the corruption could have been so faulty that the school would have broken down without an earthquake. And concurrently, the earthquake could have been so bad that it would have torn down the school even if built with 88 Sepúlveda Carmona, in: International Council on Human Rights Policy (n. 5), 27 refers to this constellation as an "indirect link" between corruption and human rights violations. 89 See Sepúlveda Carmona/Bacio Terracino, in: Boersma/Nelen (n. 44), 30. perfect material and care. In such a scenario, both facts were no "necessary condition", no conditio sine qua non, because the bad result would have come about anyway. However, this would lead to the absurd assessment that there is no cause at all. Therefore, causality in the legal sense should nevertheless be affirmed, and this is indeed what international legal practice does. 90 Transferred to our problem, "competing"/"concurring" other causes (besides corruption) do not mean that the bribery may not be considered to be the legal cause of a human rights violation.
One variant, when looking at the situation over a period of time, is referred to as "overtaking"
or "pre-emptive", or "overriding" causation. As an example, assume that a judge is bribed by a party to a civil trial in order to prolong the proceedings. But because the courts have insufficient human and financial resources anyway, the trial would have been delayed substantially even without this corrupt act, and that delay in itself would have violated the right of a party to a hearing within a reasonable time.
Typically, it can no longer be determined after the fact whether the factors were (1) cumulative (both needed), or (2) concurrent ("dual", "competing", or "alternative", i.e. each sufficient on its own), or (3) "overriding". The most frequent situation seems to be that the dysfunctionality of a given governmental sector has multiple causes, only one which is corruption, and that it is impossible to determine for sure that corruption was a necessary factor in the strict sense. Using our example, it typically remains unresolvable whether the school would have collapsed in the earthquake even if it had been constructed properly (without corruption). The important point is now that in such a case, corruption might still be qualified as a legal cause. This is what general legal principles -such as the European Tort Law Principles − foresee. 91 The further question then becomes whether the causal link is close enough to attribute the deaths to the corrupt building supervisor. This must be examined in detail and may in some cases be denied. 90 However, case law exists only in regard to the second causal link needed to identify damage ("scope of responsibility"), not in regard to the first causal link between behaviour and legal breach ("cause in fact 
Causation in the case of omission
The relevant human rights violations linked to corruption often consist in the nonperformance of obligations of protection and of procedural obligations. This gives rise to the question of causation in the case of omission. Normally, legal causation in the case of omission is affirmed if the legally required positive action would, with near certainty, have eliminated the (undesirable) result. This is a softened "but for"-test. When it comes to omitting mere obligations of conduct, however, this "but for"-test does not make any sense
and cannot be applied, because these obligations do not require from the state to reach a particular result (see Section 2.4. above).
In the Bosnian Genocide case, the indicators might be sufficient to affirm a violation of these human rights "by" the omission of anti-corruption efforts of the State -analogously to the purely statistical evidence that is commonly used to show indirect discrimination.
Attribution
The next problem is how to attribute corrupt conduct to the State. According to Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the conduct of any State organ is attributable to the State itself. This is unproblematic in regard to the omissions primarily discussed above, which violate obligations of prevention and protection under human rights law. Such omissions are committed by the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of the State that fail to fulfil the obligations addressed directly to them.
Ultra vires action
The analysis is different in the case of particular individual acts of public officials, especially in the area of petty corruption. Can these be attributed to the State as a whole, so that they trigger State responsibility for the resulting human rights violations? Corrupt public officials obviously exceed their formal authority. Under the norms of State responsibility, however, ultra vires acts are in principle also attributed to the State. The precondition is that an organ of the State or a person empowered to exercise governmental authority acts "in that capacity" 94 In the Genocide case, however, the ICJ considered in regard to the causal nexus between the breach and the content of the state responsibility ("scope of responsibility", i.e. in order to determine whether Serbia owed reparations) whether genocide would have occurred even despite efforts to prevent it (ibid., para. 462). Because this could not be shown, the ICJ did not believe financial compensation by Serbia to be appropriate.
(Article 7 of the ILC Articles). Such conduct in an official capacity must be distinguished from private conduct.
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The landmark cases in international law that examine this distinction do in fact concern corrupt acts of public officials. According to this case law, it matters whether the official acted "under cover" of public office and also made use of the special (coercive) powers of the office (such as the power to search or arrest individuals). 96 According to the ILC commentary, it matters whether the corrupt person was purportedly acting in an official capacity and with "apparent authority".
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Applying these principles to our question, we see that as a rule, the corrupt official acts under cover of and with apparent public authority. The official uses his or her position to perform or omit a measure that the official would be unable to do as a private person, such as granting an authorization or licence, or refraining from public prosecution, or for imposing a fine.
Some further specific questions arise. "Freely consummated corruption" might arguably deserve to be considered as falling outside both the real and apparent authority of the public official, so that he could not be considered to have acted "in that [governmental] capacity". At issue here was a claim against Iran alleging a corrupt act by an employee of the State airline Iran Air. The claimant was forced by the airline in an unlawful way to make an "extra payment" for a plane ticket. The tribunal did not attribute this corrupt act of the State employee to Iran: "Acts which an organ commits in a purely private capacity, even if it has used the means placed at its disposal by the State for the exercise of its functions, are not attributable to the State.
[…] There is no indication in this case that the Iran Air agent was acting for any other reason than personal profit, or that he had passed on the payment to Iran Air. He evidently did not act on behalf or in the interests of Iran Air. The Tribunal finds, therefore, that this agent acted in a private capacity and not in his official capacity as an organ for Iran Air" (111, para. 65). This finding is defensible, but the reasoning is not persuasive. Rather, it was significant that the employee did not pretend to be demanding the extra payment on behalf of the State (see also Crawford 2013 (n. 51), 138). 97 into account for the determination of attribution of the action or inaction of the public official to the State. One might ask whether the knowledge of the briber about the unlawfulness of the public official's behaviour, or his participation in it, should preclude any attribution of that behaviour to the State. But such non-attribution were fair only if the official had been basically passive, and lured into the corruption by the "bad" briber -a situation which is impossible to reconstruct and maybe also unrealistic. 99 In any case, attribution to the State could not be ruled out in the relationship between the State and other actors who seek to invoke State responsibility, and who had not participated in the corruption themelves. 100 To conclude, the fact that an official's behaviour is performed as a quid pro quo in bribery normally does not rule out the attribution of that behaviour to the State. 101 All the more, other types of corrupt conduct by public officials can and should be attributed to the State in accordance with the principles of State responsibility.
The rationale of outlawing corruption
But should not, from a normative perspective, attribution be further limited in light of the rationale of outlawing corruption? Does the proscription against corrupt official acts (or the improvement of State anti-corruption measures) correspond at all to the object and purpose of human rights? Only then would it be legally appropriate to classify corrupt State conduct not only as a governance deficit and, under certain circumstances, as a criminal offence under domestic law, but simultaneously and additionally as a human rights violation.
At first glance, the criminal law on corruption and human rights law serve different objectives. The objective of the criminalization of bribery in German criminal law, for instance, is to "protect the functioning of the public administration and public trust in the objectiveness and independence of administrative conduct". 102 The goal is therefore "to protect the institution of public service and thus a fundamentally important public good". The remaining difference is that corruption is a conduct offence, while human rights violations can be found only if a concrete injury actually occurs. 105 But this important structural difference does not prevent attribution a priori; it only means that not every corrupt act also constitutes a human rights violation. If, for example, gifts presented by a pharmaceutical company to a minister of health do not ultimately succeed in modifying the ministry's patterns of purchase and of the distribution of vaccines in urban slums, this may very well be considered bribery, but the rights of the slum residents to physical integrity or health care have not been violated, because the bribery did not have an impact on their standard of care.
In the final analysis, the proscription against corruption fits the protective purpose of human rights; on the basis of these considerations, the attributive relationship between corrupt acts or omissions and human rights violations does not have to be denied.
Margin of appreciation
Even if we regard a particular corrupt act or the general failure to implement anti-corruption measures as a cause of interference with particular human rights and attribute it to a State, this does not in any way mean that everything affecting human rights also constitutes a violation thereof. Both legal and political rights and social human rights can be lawfully restricted.
In regard to social human rights, it may even make more sense not to view lesser fulfilment of the progressive implementation obligation as a "restriction" of rights, but rather to view it as an inherent limit to the scope of positive rights. A component of the fundamental treaty obligation set out in Article 2(1) ICESCR (see Section 2.6. above) is the use of "all appropriate means". The obligation to use all appropriate means is further specified by the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in terms of "reasonableness" (Article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol). 
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On the other hand, the terms "appropriate" and "reasonable" also represent an opening for defining the bottom-line of positive state action (which in German constitutional rights doctrine is called "Untermaßverbot"). State measures are not allowed to fall short of a minimum level in order to be considered "appropriate" or "reasonable". One can therefore argue that in certain situations, in the case of empirically demonstrated corruption in a State party, the prohibition of insufficient action requires the State not only to ratify the international anti-corruption instruments, but also to launch a national anti-corruption campaign and to formulate a preventive policy. 109 The concepts of "appropriateness" and "reasonableness" thus play a dual role: They serve as the cap, but also as the floor. 110 States must take "appropriate" measures -not more, but also not less. In the terminology of fundamental rights scrutiny which has been developed for liberal negative rights in domestic constitutional law, notably in Germany, this "builtin" limit to the State's obligation to perform can be qualified as the outer boundary of a right's ambit or as a limit to the allowance of the State to interfere with those rights. This scheme only awkwardly fits to the examination of a violation of the positive dimension of rights. 107 Grootboom (n. 47), para. grant that authority. In its settled case law, the CESCR emphasizes that the States parties have a substantial "margin of appreciation" in this regard. 111 The Optional Protocol expressly provides that a State party "may adopt a range of possible measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant" (Article 8(4) OP). In the final instance, however, the CESCR reserves the right to review the "appropriateness" of the means and thus of the financial resources in an authoritative way 112 -albeit without the power to enforce this determination.
In summary, both particular corrupt acts by individual public officials as well as a completely insufficient or entirely lacking anti-corruption policy of a State on the whole may, in certain constellations, be conceptualized as a violation of concrete human rights, e.g., the right to health of concrete patients or the right to equal treatment of concrete business competitors.
The greatest doctrinal obstacle in this regard is not causation or attribution, but -especially in the field of social rights -the "margin of appreciation" or "reasonableness".
Should corruption be conceptualized as a human rights violation?
An entirely different set of questions concerns the proceedings in which such a human rights violation might be claimed and whether the change in perspective -away from combatting corruption primarily with the means of criminal law toward a human rights-based approachis practical in terms of legal policy and valuable in terms of legal ethics.
The opportunity to strengthen anti-corruption
Proponents of imbuing the anti-corruption instruments with a human rights content believe that this will upgrade these instruments in political and moral terms and thus ensure improved implementation of anti-corruption measures. 113 The classical argument is "empowerment".
The human rights approach can highlight the rights of persons affected by corruption, such as the rights to safe drinking water and free primary education, and show these persons how, for instance, the misappropriation of public funds in those areas interferes with their enjoyment of the goods to which they are entitled. In that way, affected persons would be empowered to denounce corruption to which they otherwise would be helplessly exposed. misappropriation of public funds that is presumed by the practice of the CESCR and also by the UN Convention against Corruption. Article 20 UNCAC calls upon States parties to "consider" establishing "illicit enrichment" as a criminal offence. Under such a criminal law provision, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income could be punished. However, such an implicit presumption of guilt is problematic in terms of the rule of law.
The risk of weakening anti-corruption
The strength of a human rights-based approach to anti-corruption instruments is simultaneously its weakness. This is because of the ambivalent attitude of the Global South The potential of universalizability The dual critique of anti-corruption and of human rights needs to be put in perspective. The mentioned spotlight does not inevitably represent a paternalistic, civilizing mission of the West against the rest of the world. The change in perspective does not excuse grand corruption, including "legal" corruption in the Western world. It is merely less able to capture it, because grand corruption has a different, less individualized structure of wrongfulness.
With regard to the image of the State, let us look at an example: Is it true, as the critique implies, that, from the perspective of a motorist, it comes out to the same whether the sum of money he or she has to pay at a road block in order to pursue his or her course represents a bribe to a traffic police officer -as in many African States -, or a motorway toll as in France for example, and that therefore both modes of governance, the Western one and the African one should be accepted, not denouncing the latter one as "corruption." In both cases, the motorist's freedom of movement is limited by him being forced to pay.
But there is a relevant difference: The motorway toll is based on a law that serves the public interest, namely maintenance of the motorway network, and at the same time applies equally to everyone (with reasonable differences based on type of vehicle, number of persons, or other relevant criteria). In contrast, the bribe is not based on a fee schedule defined in a political or at least orderly administrative procedure -but it may under certain circumstances help feed the police officer's family. The distinction between a bribe and a State fee is thus based solely on the legitimacy and legality of the institutions and procedures in which the payment is defined, collected, and spent. This analysis confirms Augustine's 1000 year old insight that States not governed by law and justice are nothing but large bands of thieves. Two known investor − State arbitral proceedings prominently deal with corruption. In World Duty Free, a payment of 2 Million US dollar in cash as a personal donation to President Moi was made by the foreign investor in exchange for the allowance to establish and operate duty free shops in Kenyan Airports. 131 World Duty Free later claimed that it had been unlawfully expropriated in Kenya. The Arbitral Tribunal qualified the donation as a bribe, contrary "to transnationalized public policy". Therefore the contract could not be upheld, 132 and World Duty Free's claim was rejected.
In contrast, the claim by the firm Yukos against Russia was upheld. The 2014 Yukos arbitral award, rendered by a tribunal constituted under the ECT, has been praised as demonstrating the potential of "investment arbitration to bring corruption to light and act as an outside check on corrupt states." 133 In Yukos, an Arbitral Tribunal held Russia responsible for breaching its obligation under Article 13 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) by taking a measure "equivalent to nationalization or expropriation". 134 This de facto expropriation had been effected by the Russian Federation through the deliberate bancrupting and liquidation of Yukos for political and financial reasons, in order to appropriate its valuable assets. 135 In parallel to the arbitral proceedings, the ECtHR found a violation of Yukos' rights to fair hearing and property and awarded 1.9 Billion Euro just satisfaction to Yukos. 136 The arbitral tribunal described in detail the corrupt actions taken by the government against Yukos, including "harassment, intimidation, and arrests". 137 The tribunal deemed credible the witness of the claimant who had described in detail how a 50 person special unit within the General Prosecutor's Office was set up for 'working exclusively on fabricating evidence against Mr. Khodorkovsky and Yukos'". 138 The legal consequence of the Russian breach of the treaty is the international responsibility of the Russian Federation which includes the obligation to make reparation for the injury in form of monetary compensation (principles of Articles 31 and 36 ILC Articles on State responsibility, and specified in Article 13 ECT). In application of these principles, the tribunal ordered the Russian Federation to pay 50 Billion US Dollars of damages to Yukos. 139 The question is now whether the human rights approach generates fair outcomes in these cases. Unlike the international protection of the typical human rights affected by corruption (notably social rights), the transnational protection of the right to property, at least in the prominent two corruption-cases so far decided by arbitral tribunals, benefits very few extremely wealthy individuals, such as Michael Khodorkovsky (the owner of Yukos).
Arguably, the focus on State responsibility, and the ensuing establishment of a State obligation to pay compensation or just satisfaction amounting to billions of US Dollars or Euros will ultimately harm the broad population of the condemned State whose budget will be affected. In contrast, a purely criminal law approach would focus on the personal responsibility of officials only and would therefore not end up in burdening the tax payer.
However, the financial consequences of a finding of State's responsibility for that State's citizens should remain outside the purview of the international law of State responsibility.
Ultimately, any State which is ordered to pay damages (for whatever reason) will to some extent pass the brunt onto its citizens, simply because their taxes constitute the financial basis of the State. To allow this consideration to preclude State responsibility would mean to give up the idea of a separate juridical entity called State and would sit ill with the structure of international law.
As a general matter, the specific constellation involving the right to property does not seem to call into question the merits of a human rights-based approach. In normative terms, the primary reparation of infringements on human rights would be restitution in kind. Monetary compensation or "just satisfaction" (to use the term of the ECHR) comes into play only in a subsidiary fashion (cf. Art. 36(1) ILC Articles on State responsibility). In investor − State arbitration, the immediate availability of financial compensation over restitution has to do with the rule that any expropriation, in order to be lawful, requires compensation in the first place. If, for example in the Yukos case, had the remedy been the restitution of the firm from the competing Russian oligarchs to its previous owner Michael Khodorkovsky, the Russia tax payer would probably have been less affected. But in the end, it remains the case that infringements of the right to private property are a specific constellation for which the human rights approach fits less than with regard to social and political human rights.
Practice recommendations
The preceding analysis motivates some recommendations for legal practice. I suggest to complement traditional criminal-law based anti-corruption efforts by human rights-based strategies. The result could be described as mutual mainstreaming. 140 Human rights mainstreaming of anti-corruption efforts would mean that the realization of human rights would be one of the anti-corruption goals from the outset. In legal practice, this would imply an interpretation of all criminal offences relating to corruption in a way that takes into account human rights of victims.
On a complementary basis, the international human rights procedures should be corruptionmainstreamed as following. 141 In the work of the human rights Treaty Bodies, the guidelines for all country reports and for all country-specific concluding observations of the committees should include corruption as a checkpoint that must be addressed. The recent practice of the Treaty Bodies, 142 first of all the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 143 to through corruption, this would be a strong sanction. In many States, however, this is not to be expected, due to corruption in the justice system. 147 This means that the human rights lens does not necessarily empower individual victims of corruption in the practical sense of opening up new pathways of access to justice for them. The empowering effect of the human rights-based approach is first of all symbolic.
Conclusion
In terms of communication theory, the change in perspective proposed here is a kind of "framing", i.e., a new intellectual framework associated with a new prerogative of interpretation. Importantly, this prerogative shifts in institutional terms as well, away from the World Bank and toward the UN Human Rights Council. Potentially, this new discursive power entails a new power to act.
In legal theory terms, the connection between anti-corruption law and human rights protection is an example for the systemic integration of two subareas of international law. Or, the human rights approach to anti-corruption instruments can be seen as the constitutionalization of the latter. By elevating corruption to a constitutional matter, the new framing makes anticorruption an all-the-more legitimate concern of the international community. Some international lawyers complain that this smacks of "human rightism", 148 or of a "hubris" of international human rights protection. 149 But this alleged hubris can also be seen in more positive terms as the reinstitution of the human being as the normative reference point for all law, including international law.
Speaking practically, the global anti-corruption effort does not need new institutions but better implementation. The human rights-approach can contribute to closing the implementation gap. Based on the insight that corruption "undermines" the enjoyment of human rights, the universal, non-adversarial human rights monitoring bodies may legitimately address corruption in detail without overstepping their mandate. But it is a different question whether corruption can in itself constitute a human rights violation which can be invoked in an individual complaints procedure. The demonstration of an actual violation is difficult in terms of both legal argument and proof but possible, as this paper has sought to show. By contributing to a change of the frame of reference and by opening up new options for 147 See above note 23. "Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption", Article 11(1)UNCAC prescribes that "each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary." 148 
